Correctness of the two-phase commit protocol

J. van Leeuwen

RUU-CS-89-34
December 1989
Correctness of the two-phase commit protocol

J. van Leeuwen

Technical Report RUU-CS-89-34
December 1989

Department of Computer Science
Utrecht University
P.O.Box 80.089
3508 TB Utrecht
The Netherlands
CORRECTNESS OF THE TWO-PHASE COMMIT PROTOCOL*

Jan van Leeuwen

Department of Computer Science, University of Utrecht,
P.O. Box 80.089, 3508 TB Utrecht,
the Netherlands

Abstract

The 2-phase individual commit protocol is a standard algorithm for safeguarding the atomicity of transactions in a distributed system. A self-contained description of the 2-phase commit protocol is presented and verified.

Keywords and phrases: distributed systems, client/server model, message passing, atomic actions, two-phase commit protocol, correctness criteria.

1 Introduction

In order to deal with the complex issues of communication and control in a distributed system, it is necessary to have a consistent architectural model underlying the design and development of a system. Additional requirements are imposed by the agreed ISO and ECMA standards for remote operations and transaction processing (see e.g. [9]). In many distributed systems the client/server paradigm is used to explain the underlying system view, suggesting the possibility of a formal model and correctness proofs of the design. The rationale for the Client/Server (or Customer/Server) model was first described by Gentleman [5], who identified the issues that need to be resolved in any system designed from this perspective. The model is heavily based on the "abstract object" approach to distributed system design (Sloman & Kramer [13], Watson [19]).

The Client/Server model can be viewed as a unifying framework for the high-level description and specification of communications and interactions between processes. The model is based on the idea that in a distributed system certain processes (clients) will be requesting functions from other processes (servers) and that all distributed activity can be seen from this perspective. The model tends to declare fixed processes (processors) as clients and others as servers, which is adequate in systems where client/server functions are logically and physically separated but which certainly need not always be the case. The Client/Server model allows "many-to-one" and "one-to-many" interactions between

---

*This work was carried out as part of a research agreement with NCR Systems Engineering b.v., P.O. Box 492, 3430 AL Nieuwegein, the Netherlands. A preliminary version of this paper appeared as part of [17] and in: J.W. de Bakker, 25 jaar Semantiek, Liber Amicorum, CWI, Amsterdam, April 1989, pp. 319-327.
processes. In the latter case, a client process (A) requests the services of various servers and (hence) engages in multiple sessions simultaneously. It is the client's task to synchronize the various sessions, when necessary.

A common case arises if the simultaneous requests that a client A sends out are not independent but are part of "one" (indivisible) transaction. Typically, a request should only be processed (committed) if all requests that are part of the transaction can be processed (committed). This leads to the well-known problems of transaction management (see e.g. Gray [6], Ceri & Pelagatti [2] or [7]), in particular to the need for transaction commitment and recovery protocols.

In this paper we consider one particular and well-known protocol for organizing the one-to-many interaction between clients and servers in a transaction, namely: the 2-phase individual commit protocol. An integral development and correctness proof is given for a standard individual commit protocol that seems to be appreciably simpler and more clarifying than similar treatments in the current literature (see e.g. [1, 2]). The paper is primarily intended as a tutorial.

The development of the individual commit protocol will be given in Section 2. The remainder of this section indicates some of the practical constraints that make the design of a protocol of this kind non-trivial, and digresses on some of the assumptions that we need to make. For a broader introduction to the issues of reliability and recovery in distributed systems we refer to [10, 16].

1.1 Complications because of possible failures

The Client/Server model as presented is a model for process interaction. One process (A) identified as the client requests a service, or wants to carry out a transaction, involving one or more processes (B) which act as servers. The servers, after performing their part of the transaction, post a reply to the client. The client-server relationships exist for the duration of the interaction between the processes and cease as soon as the client has received all replies. So far there is no particular problem.

The Client/Server model is deceptively simple as long as communication failures and other failures are not taken into consideration. However, in a distributed system there are various types of communication failure that can occur: messages may be lost or "stuck" (e.g. because of deadlock), messages may be undeliverable (e.g. because one or more communication lines are down), and processes may "die".

Failures complicate the simple interaction scheme of the Client/Server model at the message-level, because the request/reply mechanism must be considerably more sophisticated for handling failures. In particular, the reply a client receives on a request should either be a valid reply from the server or an indication from the network manager that no valid reply from the intended server can be obtained because of some (identifiable or non-identifiable) failure. In the Client/Server model, a client must receive a reply (and no more than one) to every request it sends out, and the replies received must correspond exactly to the "facts" for the associated requests. It follows that replies are not simple and must be "interpreted". For a more detailed exposition of the Client/Server model and its implementation, see e.g. [3, 15, 17, 18].
1.2 The use of timers

Failures affect the Client/Server model in yet another way. In physical communications systems, it is common to guard for failures by the use of acknowledgements (acks) and/or timers. Acknowledgements can be merged with replies, but timers are very different entities. Svobodova et al. [14] discuss the difficulty of “timeout parameters” for programming at length, but there is no question that timers are often the simplest and most adequate solution to communications control problems in concrete systems. For example, timers are used in the implementation of reliable remote procedure calls (see e.g. Lampson [12]), in connection management protocols (see e.g. Fletcher & Watson [4]), and for “crash control” in transaction management systems. Not surprisingly, we will also be using timers in the development of the 2-phase commit protocol presented in Section 2.

In typical distributed systems timers are available implicitly (at the client side) or explicitly (at the server side) for request-handling purposes and session maintenance. In the protocol we will study, timers are not needed for correctness reasons but merely to avoid indefinite waits. At the client side, a timeout value can be set with every request to indicate how long one is willing to wait for a reply. A timeout is triggered when no reply is received in the prescribed time-interval or when an exception has occurred in the underlying transport layer. At the server side, a timeout value can be set with every session. In this case the timeout value indicates how long the server is willing to wait for “new” requests from one of its clients viz. from the particular session. (It is common to assume that the corresponding timer is reset to the timeout value each time a new request in the session is received before timeout.) Multiple timers must be implemented explicitly by means of incremental timeout queues (as described in e.g. Tanenbaum [15]). In all cases timeouts are handled as interrupts, and some action must be specified when a timeout occurs. At the client side it typically involves “retrying” a request that timed out, which leads to the problem of duplicate detection by the server. At the server side a session that timed out, is to be closed explicitly. In this paper both clients and servers will be allowed to activate timers and act on timeouts.

1.3 Managing Atomic Actions

The Client/Server model assumes that clients and servers interact strictly on a request/reply basis. In applications it may be desirable that a client and a server interact in a more complex manner during a session and engage in an activity (a set of operations or “an action”) that affects the information stored at the client and the server simultaneously and in an indivisible manner. Activities of this kind are called “transactions” or “atomic actions”. Atomic actions would pose no particular problem if it weren’t for the fact that in all realistic applications “exceptions” and “failures” (like link failures or site crashes) can occur during an atomic action, like described. We will use the term “failure” to refer to any abnormal condition that arises during an atomic action. The possibility of failures requires that the effects of an atomic action must be recoverable at all times throughout its elaboration, until the atomic action can be regarded as “safely completed” at both ends. The implementation of atomic actions thus requires two basic facilities (see e.g. Gray [6]):

(i) a recovery mechanism, i.e., a mechanism for “undo-ing” the effect of one or more atomic actions. Recovery mechanisms are always based on the use of logs that record information on the processing of atomic actions at each site, and on a method for
effectuating a rollback. Logs must be recoverable in case of failures and thus must be kept on "stable storage".

(ii) an atomic commit protocol, i.e., a protocol for detecting "safe completion" and committing the effects of an atomic action at both ends. Atomic commit protocols are atomic actions and thus must be recoverable themselves.

The occurrence of a failure at some site does not necessarily imply that the atomic actions in progress must all be aborted and rolled back. It may be possible for a node to recover to a consistent state, based on information in its log. (This is called "independent recovery".) After recovery, a site may wish to have an atomic action re-started.

1.4 Implementation of atomic actions

The implementation of atomic actions in the context of possible failures is a well-studied problem. In this report we only discuss some aspects of the atomic commit problem, as it appears in enhanced Client/Server architectures. An excellent introduction to concurrency control and recovery in distributed databases was given by Bernstein et al. [1]. Also, a detailed recommendation for the implementation of atomic commit protocols appears in the CCR standard of ISO [8]. It suggests that atomic commit protocols follow some version of the well-known 2-phase commit protocol due to Gray [6] and Lampson & Sturgis [11], and use the following primitives:

(i) C - BEGIN
(ii) C - PREPARE
(iii) C - READY
(iv) C - REFUSE
(v) C - COMMIT
(vi) C - ROLLBACK
(vii) C - RESTART

Our main goal here is to give a more refined and complete presentation of the protocol than is usually given (cf. [1, 2]) and prove its correctness. As it will require no extra effort, we will describe the protocol for the more general case of a client-initiated atomic action that involves multiple servers. It is assumed that the client remains the "coordinator" (or "superior") of the atomic action and thus of the atomic commit protocol. The client will only initiate the commit protocol (with a C-PREPARE primitive) if it has reason to do so, i.e., if the activity of the atomic action at its own site has ended (which implies that the servers have provided their operation results insofar as needed by the client). At all times during the atomic action, the client and the servers must be ready to honor a C-ROLLBACK or C-RESTART request from any party in the atomic action. Note that the servers only communicate with the client, but not with each other (during the atomic actions).
2 The (2-phase) individual commit protocol

In this section we develop the standard 2-phase individual commit protocol and prove its correctness. We first need to state what is meant by the "correctness" of the protocol.

2.1 Correctness criteria for atomic commit protocols

Applied to an atomic action, an atomic commit protocol is a distributed algorithm for the client and the servers that should guarantee that they all commit or all abort the atomic action. Following Bernstein et al. [1] the situation for an atomic commit protocol can be rephrased in more precise terms as follows. Each party (client or server) may cast exactly one of two votes: C-READY ("yes") or C-REFUSE ("no"), and can reach exactly one of two decisions: C-COMMIT ("commit") or C-ROLLBACK ("abort"). An atomic commit protocol must satisfy the following requirements:

AC1 : A party cannot change its vote after it has cast a vote.
AC2 : All parties that reach a decision reach the same decision.
AC3 : A party cannot change its decision after it has reached one.
AC4 : A C-COMMIT decision can be reached only if all parties voted and voted C-READY.
AC5 : If there are no failures and all parties voted C-READY, then the decision C-COMMIT will be reached by all parties.
AC6 : Consider any execution of the protocol in the context of permissible failures. At any point in this execution, if all current failures have been repaired and no new failures occur for a sufficiently long period of time, then all parties will eventually reach a decision.

The requirements can be viewed as the minimal correctness criteria for atomic commit protocols. (Except for AC1, the requirements are taken from Bernstein et al. [2].) AC1 through AC5 can usually be satisfied quite easily, but AC6 requires a suitable recovery procedure to be part of the protocol. Note that after voting C-READY, a party (client or server) can not be certain of what the decision will be until it has received sufficient information to decide. Until that moment, we say that the party is "uncertain". If a failure occurs that cuts an uncertain party off, then this party is said to be blocked. A blocked party cannot reach a decision until after the connection to the other parties has been restored. Blocking is usually concluded if no messages arrive during a certain timeout interval within the uncertainly period. (Heuristic commit protocols allow a blocked party to make a calculated guess of the decision. In some versions of the protocol the blocked party is allowed to commit.) A different situation arises when a party fails (crashes) during its uncertainty period. In this case a more involved recovery procedure has to be followed (see Bernstein et al. [2] or below).

3 The (2-phase) individual commit protocol

The standard (2-phase) atomic commit protocol is as follows, in terms of the recommended CCR primitives. (Note that the desired steps of the recovery procedure after failure are part of the overall protocol, but these are not included in the basic specification below.)
Individual Commit Protocol

Client’s Commit

c-0. Vote ready;

Phase 1

c-1. Write “prepare” record to the Log;
c-2. Send C-PREPARE messages to all servers; activate timer;
c-3. {Await answer messages (C-READY or C-REFUSE) from all servers using
a timer and act as follows}
Case condition of

c-3.1. Timeout or C-REFUSE message received:
begin
    Write “rollback” record to the Log;
    Send C-ROLLBACK messages to all servers;
    C-ROLLBACK
end;
c-3.2. All servers answered and answered C-READY:
    continue with Phase 2
end;

{End of Phase 1}

Phase 2

c-4. Write “commit” record to the Log;
c-5. Send C-COMMIT messages to all servers; activate timer;
c-6. {Await answer messages (ACK) from all servers using a timer and act
as follows}
CASE condition of

c-6.1. Timeout: Write “incomplete” record to the Log;
c-6.2. All servers answered (ACK):
    Write “complete” record to the Log;
end;
c-7. C-COMMIT;

{End of Phase 2}

Server’s Commit

Phase 1

s-1. Await a C-PREPARE message from the client using timer;
    {The server will only pass this point if it has indeed received a
    C-PREPARE message from the client or timed out}
s-2. If not timed out then Vote ready or refuse;
s-3. Case condition of
    s-3.1. ready:
        begin
            Write “ready” record to the Log;
            Send a C-READY message to the client;
            continue with Phase 2
        end;
s-3.2. refuse:
begin
  Write "refuse" record to the Log;
  Send a C-REFUSE message to the client
end

s-3.3. Timeout:
  Write "refuse" record to the Log
end;

{End of Phase 1}

Phase 2

s-4. Await a decision message (C-COMMIT or C-ROLLBACK) from the client using timer;
   {The server will only pass this point if it has indeed received a decision message from the client or times out}

s-5. Case condition of

  s-5.1. a C-COMMIT message was received:
         begin
         Write "commit" record to the Log;
         Send ACK message to the client;
         C-COMMIT
         end;

  s-5.2. a C-ROLLBACK message was received:
         begin
         Write "rollback" message to the Log;
         C-ROLLBACK
         end;

  s-5.3. Timeout:
         take whatever action to deal with blocking
end;

{End of Phase 2}

Although it is not explicitly specified, each party can unilaterally decide for a C-ROLLBACK at any time if it has not (yet) voted "ready". We assume that the Client's Commit protocol is only initiated by the client after it has voted "ready". If a client never votes or votes "refuse", then it never sends a C-PREPARE message and the servers automatically time out eventually in their protocol. (We could have treated the client as a server in the protocol, but have chosen not to do so in order to save messages.) We require that C-COMMIT messages are ack'ed, but this can be omitted from the protocol without any harm. (We do not require that C-ROLLBACK messages are ack'ed, but could incorporate it easily if desired.) Voting essentially amounts to determining whether the local activities in an atomic action have ended and properly been logged or not, but we only need it as an "abstract" operation. Where ever a "Log" is specified in the protocol, the local (client or server) log is meant. A "Phase 2" is not entered automatically after a "Phase 1", but only on an explicit "continue".
3.1 Correctness proof

It should be an interesting research topic to develop a completely formal "correctness proof" for the Individual Commit Protocol. We outline a less formal proof here. We refer to line-numbers as c-0, c-1, etcetera.

**Theorem A** If no timeouts and no failures occur, then the Individual Commit Protocol is correct.

**Proof.**
The requirements AC1 through AC5 are trivially satisfied. For AC2, note that if any party (client or server) decides spontaneously for C-ROLLBACK when it can, then all parties must follow suit eventually and cannot decide for anything else. AC6 is vacuously true. □

The next step is to consider the possibility of timeouts and a limited type of failures, namely "loss of protocol messages". In all cases except one, message loss necessarily leads to a timeout and thus it is sufficient to consider the latter only. The one exceptional case can arise in c-3, when some messages (including a C-REFUSE) have arrived but some have not and the clients acts on the C-REFUSE. In this case the client acts just like it would have in the case of timeout (line c-3.1.). Note that heavily delayed messages are considered "lost".

**Theorem B** If timeouts and loss of messages can occur but no server gets blocked, then the Individual Commit Protocol is correct.

**Proof.**
The requirements AC1, AC3 and AC4 are trivially satisfied. For AC2, observe the following. If a server times out on s-1, it will never send a message and can only decide C-ROLLBACK (if it ever decides, cf. s-3.3.). The client necessarily executes c-3.1. and decides for C-ROLLBACK too. Other servers either time out on s-1 as well or receive the C-ROLLBACK decision in s-4. By assumption no server times out on s-4 (the blocked case). If the client times out on c-3.1., then it decides C-ROLLBACK and the servers can only reach the same decision by the very same argument. If the client times out on c-6.1., the only possible decision in the system is C-COMMIT and all servers must be in Phase 2. As we assume no blocking, all servers will eventually decide C-COMMIT. Thus AC2 is satisfied and, by the latter argument, AC5 as well. AC6 is vacuously true. □

In order to get any further we must some how deal with the problem of blocking. A blocked server timed out on s-5.3. and thus knows that it is blocked, but it is uncertain of the decision that may have been reached. In order to keep the Individual Commit Protocol correct, a Server's Commit Termination Protocol must be added. The purpose of the Server's Commit Termination protocol is to enable a blocked server to determine the (apparent) decision reached in the system. Several possible strategies for a successful Server's Commit Termination protocol have been proposed, all based on polling. (For example, if another server can be reached and it appears to have timed out on s-1, then the blocked server can decide C-ROLLBACK.) But no Server's Commit Termination protocol can guarantee that it will remove the possibility of blocking. (For example, if a blocked node is cut off permanently, it will forever remain uncertain.) We assume that any server can eventually reach the client again and thus a simple polling of the client will do as a
Server's Commit Termination protocol (cf. requirement AC6). We conclude the following result.

**Theorem C** If timeouts and loss of messages can occur, then the Individual Commit Protocol enhanced with the Server's Commit Termination protocol is correct.

The final step is to allow timeouts and arbitrary failures, i.e., "loss of protocol messages" and "site crashes". If a site crashes permanently, the Individual Commit Protocol will simply continue in the remaining sites and perform as if the messages of the crashed site are lost from some point onwards. The Server's Commit Termination protocol should be extended in this case and somehow detect permanent crashes of the client. In general there is no guaranteed solution that avoids blocking, if permanent crashes can occur. Thus we assume that each site that crashes eventually recovers and resumes the commit protocol. We also assume that a site can actually recover to the point where it crashed, using the information in its log. The only problem now is to determine how to continue with the commit protocol, knowing that the other sites may have advanced in it after the crash. We present a possible recovery protocol below.

**Commit Recovery Protocol**

**Client's Commit Recovery**

cr-1. If the client crashed before c-4 then
begin
Write "rollback" record to the Log;
Send C-ROLLBACK messages to all servers;
end;
cr-2. If the client crashed after c-4 but before c-6.2. then
begin
Write "commit" record to the Log;
Send C-COMMIT messages to all servers; activate timer;
{Await answer messages from all servers using timer and act as follows }
Case condition of
Timeout: Write "incomplete" record to the Log;
All servers answered: Write "complete" record to the Log
end;
C-COMMIT
end;
cr-3. If the client crashed after c-6.2. then
begin
perform c-7 if necessary
end;

**Server's Commit Recovery**

sr-1. If the server crashed before s-4 and without having executed s-3.1.
then
begin
C-ROLLBACK
end;
sr-2. If the server crashed after s-4 while being uncertain
then
begin
use the Server's Commit Termination protocol to remove blocking
end;
sr-3. If the server crashed after s-4 while being certain
then
begin
perform remaining activity if necessary in the C-COMMIT or
C-ROLLBACK
(whatever applies)
end;

We assume that Write/Send commands in the Individual Commit Protocol are atomic, and thus no crash occurs “in between” a Write and the subsequent Send. (While the assumption is reasonable, it would nevertheless be of interest to analyse the protocol if this assumption is not made.)

**Theorem D** The Individual Commit Protocol enhanced with the Server’s Commit Termination protocol and the Commit Recovery Protocol is a correct atomic commit protocol.

**Proof.**
If the client crashes before c-4, then each server either has C-ROLLBACK as the only option or is uncertain. Thus cr-1 is a correct recovery action, in the sense of satisfying the requirements. If the client crashes in its Phase 2, then each server has either decided C-COMMIT or is uncertain. Replaying Phase 2 (in so far as it is needed according to the recovery log) is again the right action, assuming that the servers detect duplicate messages. If a server crashed in its Phase 1 and without sending a C-READY message, then the remaining sites will have progressed on the assumption that its messages are C-REFUSE or “lost”. It means that the remaining sites are on their way to decide C-ROLLBACK, and sr-1 is fully consistent with this. If a server crashed after having sent a C-READY message, then either it had decided (and the decision is recovered) or is uncertain. Thus sr-2 and sr-3 are the actions to take. With the earlier analyses it easily follows that the complete protocol satisfies AC1 through AC6 and hence is correct. □
References


Correctness of the two-phase commit protocol

J. van Leeuwen

RUU-CS-89-34
December 1989
Correctness of the two-phase commit protocol

J. van Leeuwen

Technical Report RUU-CS-89-34
December 1989

Department of Computer Science
Utrecht University
P.O.Box 80.089
3508 TB Utrecht
The Netherlands
CORRECTNESS OF THE TWO-PHASE COMMIT PROTOCOL*

Jan van Leeuwen

Department of Computer Science, University of Utrecht,
P.O. Box 80.089, 3508 TB Utrecht,
the Netherlands

Abstract

The 2-phase individual commit protocol is a standard algorithm for safeguarding
the atomicity of transactions in a distributed system. A self-contained description of
the 2-phase commit protocol is presented and verified.

Keywords and phrases: distributed systems, client/server model, message passing,
atomic actions, two-phase commit protocol, correctness criteria.

1 Introduction

In order to deal with the complex issues of communication and control in a distributed
system, it is necessary to have a consistent architectural model underlying the design and
development of a system. Additional requirements are imposed by the agreed ISO and
ECMA standards for remote operations and transaction processing (see e.g. [9]). In many
distributed systems the client/server paradigm is used to explain the underlying system
view, suggesting the possibility of a formal model and correctness proofs of the design.
The rationale for the Client/Server (or Customer/Server) model was first described by
Gentleman [5], who identified the issues that need to be resolved in any system designed
from this perspective. The model is heavily based on the "abstract object" approach to
distributed system design (Sloman & Kramer [13], Watson [19]).

The Client/Server model can be viewed as a unifying framework for the high-level
description and specification of communications and interactions between processes. The
model is based on the idea that in a distributed system certain processes (clients) will be
requesting functions from other processes (servers) and that all distributed activity can
be seen from this perspective. The model tends to declare fixed processes (processors) as
clients and others as servers, which is adequate in systems where client/server functions
are logically and physically separated but which certainly need not always be the case.
The Client/Server model allows "many-to-one" and "one-to-many" interactions between

---

*This work was carried out as part of a research agreement with NCR Systems Engineering b.v., P.O.
Box 492, 3430 AL Nieuwegein, the Netherlands. A preliminary version of this paper appeared as part
319-327.
processes. In the latter case, a client process (A) requests the services of various servers and (hence) engages in multiple sessions simultaneously. It is the client's task to synchronize the various sessions, when necessary.

A common case arises if the simultaneous requests that a client A sends out are not independent but are part of "one" (indivisible) transaction. Typically, a request should only be processed (committed) if all requests that are part of the transaction can be processed (committed). This leads to the well-known problems of transaction management (see e.g. Gray [6], Ceri & Pelagatti [2] or [7]), in particular to the need for transaction commitment and recovery protocols.

In this paper we consider one particular and well-known protocol for organizing the one-to-many interaction between clients and servers in a transaction, namely: the 2-phase individual commit protocol. An integral development and correctness proof is given for a standard individual commit protocol that seems to be appreciably simpler and more clarifying than similar treatments in the current literature (see e.g. [1, 2]). The paper is primarily intended as a tutorial.

The development of the individual commit protocol will be given in Section 2. The remainder of this section indicates some of the practical constraints that make the design of a protocol of this kind non-trivial, and digresses on some of the assumptions that we need to make. For a broader introduction to the issues of reliability and recovery in distributed systems we refer to [10, 16].

1.1 Complications because of possible failures

The Client/Server model as presented is a model for process interaction. One process (A) identified as the client requests a service, or wants to carry out a transaction, involving one or more processes (B) which act as servers. The servers, after performing their part of the transaction, post a reply to the client. The client-server relationships exist for the duration of the interaction between the processes and cease as soon as the client has received all replies. So far there is no particular problem.

The Client/Server model is deceptively simple as long as communication failures and other failures are not taken into consideration. However, in a distributed system there are various types of communication failure that can occur: messages may be lost or "stuck" (e.g. because of deadlock), messages may be undeliverable (e.g. because one or more communication lines are down), and processes may "die".

Failures complicate the simple interaction scheme of the Client/Server model at the message-level, because the request/reply mechanism must be considerably more sophisticated for handling failures. In particular, the reply a client receives on a request should either be a valid reply from the server or an indication from the network manager that no valid reply from the intended server can be obtained because of some (identifiable or non-identifiable) failure. In the Client/Server model, a client must receive a reply (and no more than one) to every request it sends out, and the replies received must correspond exactly to the "facts" for the associated requests. It follows that replies are not simple and must be "interpreted". For a more detailed exposition of the Client/Server model and its implementation, see e.g. [3, 15, 17, 18].
1.2 The use of timers

Failures affect the Client/Server model in yet another way. In physical communications systems, it is common to guard for failures by the use of acknowledgements (acks) and/or timers. Acknowledgements can be merged with replies, but timers are very different entities. Svobodova et al. [14] discuss the difficulty of "timeout parameters" for programming at length, but there is no question that timers are often the simplest and most adequate solution to communications control problems in concrete systems. For example, timers are used in the implementation of reliable remote procedure calls (see e.g. Lampson [12]), in connection management protocols (see e.g. Fletcher & Watson [4]), and for "crash control" in transaction management systems. Not surprisingly, we will also be using timers in the development of the 2-phase commit protocol presented in Section 2.

In typical distributed systems timers are available implicitly (at the client side) or explicitly (at the server side) for request-handling purposes and session maintenance. In the protocol we will study, timers are not needed for correctness reasons but merely to avoid indefinite waits. At the client side, a timeout value can be set with every request to indicate how long one is willing to wait for a reply. A timeout is triggered when no reply is received in the prescribed time-interval or when an exception has occurred in the underlying transport layer. At the server side, a timeout value can be set with every session. In this case the timeout value indicates how long the server is willing to wait for "new" requests from one of its clients viz. from the particular session. (It is common to assume that the corresponding timer is reset to the timeout value each time a new request in the session is received before timeout.) Multiple timers must be implemented explicitly by means of incremental timeout queues (as described in e.g. Tanenbaum [15]). In all cases timeouts are handled as interrupts, and some action must be specified when a timeout occurs. At the client side it typically involves "retrying" a request that timed out, which leads to the problem of duplicate detection by the server. At the server side a session that timed out, is to be closed explicitly. In this paper both clients and servers will be allowed to activate timers and act on timeouts.

1.3 Managing Atomic Actions

The Client/Server model assumes that clients and servers interact strictly on a request/reply basis. In applications it may be desirable that a client and a server interact in a more complex manner during a session and engage in an activity (a set of operations or "an action") that affects the information stored at the client and the server simultaneously and in an indivisible manner. Activities of this kind are called "transactions" or "atomic actions". Atomic actions would pose no particular problem if it weren't for the fact that in all realistic applications "exceptions" and "failures" (like link failures or site crashes) can occur during an atomic action, like described. We will use the term "failure" to refer to any abnormal condition that arises during an atomic action. The possibility of failures requires that the effects of an atomic action must be recoverable at all times throughout its elaboration, until the atomic action can be regarded as "safely completed" at both ends. The implementation of atomic actions thus requires two basic facilities (see e.g. Gray [6]):

(i) a recovery mechanism, i.e., a mechanism for "undo-ing" the effect of one or more atomic actions. Recovery mechanisms are always based on the use of logs that record information on the processing of atomic actions at each site, and on a method for
effectuating a rollback. Logs must be recoverable in case of failures and thus must be kept on “stable storage”.

(ii) an atomic commit protocol, i.e., a protocol for detecting “safe completion” and committing the effects of an atomic action at both ends. Atomic commit protocols are atomic actions and thus must be recoverable themselves.

The occurrence of a failure at some site does not necessarily imply that the atomic actions in progress must all be aborted and rolled back. It may be possible for a node to recover to a consistent state, based on information in its log. (This is called “independent recovery”.) After recovery, a site may wish to have an atomic action re-started.

1.4 Implementation of atomic actions

The implementation of atomic actions in the context of possible failures is a well-studied problem. In this report we only discuss some aspects of the atomic commit problem, as it appears in enhanced Client/Server architectures. An excellent introduction to concurrency control and recovery in distributed databases was given by Bernstein et al. [1]. Also, a detailed recommendation for the implementation of atomic commit protocols appears in the CCR standard of ISO [8]. It suggests that atomic commit protocols follow some version of the well-known 2-phase commit protocol due to Gray [6] and Lampson & Sturgis [11], and use the following primitives:

(i) C - BEGIN
(ii) C - PREPARE
(iii) C - READY
(iv) C - REFUSE
(v) C - COMMIT
(vi) C - ROLLBACK
(vii) C - RESTART

Our main goal here is to give a more refined and complete presentation of the protocol than is usually given (cf. [1, 2]) and prove its correctness. As it will require no extra effort, we will describe the protocol for the more general case of a client-initiated atomic action that involves multiple servers. It is assumed that the client remains the “coordinator” (or “superior”) of the atomic action and thus of the atomic commit protocol. The client will only initiate the commit protocol (with a C-PREPARE primitive) if it has reason to do so, i.e., if the activity of the atomic action at its own site has ended (which implies that the servers have provided their operation results insofar as needed by the client). At all times during the atomic action, the client and the servers must be ready to honor a C-ROLLBACK or C-RESTART request from any party in the atomic action. Note that the servers only communicate with the client, but not with each other (during the atomic actions).
2 The (2-phase) individual commit protocol

In this section we develop the standard 2-phase individual commit protocol and prove its correctness. We first need to state what is meant by the "correctness" of the protocol.

2.1 Correctness criteria for atomic commit protocols

Applied to an atomic action, an atomic commit protocol is a distributed algorithm for the client and the servers that should guarantee that they all commit or all abort the atomic action. Following Bernstein et al. [1] the situation for an atomic commit protocol can be rephrased in more precise terms as follows. Each party (client or server) may cast exactly one of two votes: C-READY ("yes") or C-REFUSE ("no"), and can reach exactly one of two decisions: C-COMMIT ("commit") or C-ROLLBACK ("abort"). An atomic commit protocol must satisfy the following requirements:

AC1 : A party cannot change its vote after it has cast a vote.
AC2 : All parties that reach a decision reach the same decision.
AC3 : A party cannot change its decision after it has reached one.
AC4 : A C-COMMIT decision can be reached only if all parties voted and voted C-READY.
AC5 : If there are no failures and all parties voted C-READY, then the decision C-COMMIT will be reached by all parties.
AC6 : Consider any execution of the protocol in the context of permissible failures. At any point in this execution, if all current failures have been repaired and no new failures occur for a sufficiently long period of time, then all parties will eventually reach a decision.

The requirements can be viewed as the minimal correctness criteria for atomic commit protocols. (Except for AC1, the requirements are taken from Bernstein et al. [2].) AC1 through AC5 can usually be satisfied quite easily, but AC6 requires a suitable recovery procedure to be part of the protocol. Note that after voting C-READY, a party (client or server) can not be certain of what the decision will be until it has received sufficient information to decide. Until that moment, we say that the party is "uncertain". If a failure occurs that cuts an uncertain party off, then this party is said to be blocked. A blocked party cannot reach a decision until after the connection to the other parties has been restored. Blocking is usually concluded if no messages arrive during a certain timeout interval within the uncertainty period. (Heuristic commit protocols allow a blocked party to make a calculated guess of the decision. In some versions of the protocol a blocked client is allowed to commit.) A different situation arises when a party fails (crashes) during its uncertainty period. In this case a more involved recovery procedure has to be followed (see Bernstein et al. [2] or below).

3 The (2-phase) individual commit protocol

The standard (2-phase) atomic commit protocol is as follows, in terms of the recommended CCR primitives. (Note that the desired steps of the recovery procedure after failure are part of the overall protocol, but these are not included in the basic specification below.)

5
Individual Commit Protocol

Client’s Commit

c-0. Vote ready;
Phase 1

c-1. Write “prepare” record to the Log;
c-2. Send C-PREPARE messages to all servers; activate timer;
c-3. {Await answer messages (C-READY or C-REFUSE) from all servers using a timer and act as follows}
Case condition of
  c-3.1. Timeout or C-REFUSE message received:
      begin
        Write “rollback” record to the Log;
        Send C-ROLLBACK messages to all servers;
        C-ROLLBACK
      end;
  c-3.2. All servers answered and answered C-READY:
      continue with Phase 2
end;
{End of Phase 1}
Phase 2

c-4. Write “commit” record to the Log;
c-5. Send C-COMMIT messages to all servers; activate timer;
c-6. {Await answer messages (ACK) from all servers using a timer and act as follows}
CASE condition of
  c-6.1. Timeout: Write “incomplete” record to the Log;
c-6.2. All servers answered (ACK):
      Write “complete” record to the Log;
end;
c-7. C-COMMIT;
{End of Phase 2}

Server’s Commit

Phase 1

s-1. Await a C-PREPARE message from the client using timer;
    {The server will only pass this point if it has indeed received a C-PREPARE message from the client or timed out}
s-2. If not timed out then Vote ready or refuse;
s-3. Case condition of
s-3.1. ready:
    begin
      Write “ready” record to the Log;
      Send a C-READY message to the client;
      continue with Phase 2
    end;
s-3.2. refuse:
begin
  Write "refuse" record to the Log;
  Send a C-REFUSE message to the client
end

s-3.3. Timeout:
  Write "refuse" record to the Log
end;
{End of Phase 1}

Phase 2

s-4. Await a decision message (C-COMMIT or C-ROLLBACK) from the client
   using timer;
   {The server will only pass this point if it has indeed received a decision
    message from the client or times out}

s-5. Case condition of
s-5.1. a C-COMMIT message was received:
   begin
     Write "commit" record to the Log;
     Send ACK message to the client;
     C-COMMIT
   end;

s-5.2. a C-ROLLBACK message was received:
   begin
     Write "rollback" message to the Log;
     C-ROLLBACK
   end;

s-5.3. Timeout:
   take whatever action to deal with blocking
end;
{End of Phase 2}

Although it is not explicitly specified, each party can unilaterally decide for a C-ROLLBACK at any time if it has not (yet) voted "ready". We assume that the Client's Commit protocol is only initiated by the client after it has voted "ready". If a client never votes or votes "refuse", then it never sends a C-PREPARE message and the servers automatically time out eventually in their protocol. (We could have treated the client as a server in the protocol, but have chosen not to do so in order to save messages.) We require that C-COMMIT messages are ack'ed, but this can be omitted from the protocol without any harm. (We do not require that C-ROLLBACK messages are ack'ed, but could incorporate it easily if desired.) Voting essentially amounts to determining whether the local activities in an atomic action have ended and properly been logged or not, but we only need it as an "abstract" operation. Where ever a "Log" is specified in the protocol, the local (client or server) log is meant. A "Phase 2" is not entered automatically after a "Phase 1", but only on an explicit "continue".
3.1 Correctness proof

It should be an interesting research topic to develop a completely formal "correctness proof" for the Individual Commit Protocol. We outline a less formal proof here. We refer to line-numbers as c-0, c-1, etcetera.

Theorem A If no timeouts and no failures occur, then the Individual Commit Protocol is correct.

Proof.
The requirements AC1 through AC5 are trivially satisfied. For AC2, note that if any party (client or server) decides spontaneously for C-ROLLBACK when it can, then all parties must follow suit eventually and cannot decide for anything else. AC6 is vacuously true. ☐

The next step is to consider the possibility of timeouts and a limited type of failures, namely "loss of protocol messages". In all cases except one, message loss necessarily leads to a timeout and thus it is sufficient to consider the latter only. The one exceptional case can arise in c-3, when some messages (including a C-REFUSE) have arrived but some have not and the clients acts on the C-REFUSE. In this case the client acts just like it would have in the case of timeout (line c-3.1.). Note that heavily delayed messages are considered "lost".

Theorem B If timeouts and loss of messages can occur but no server gets blocked, then the Individual Commit Protocol is correct.

Proof.
The requirements AC1, AC3 and AC4 are trivially satisfied. For AC2, observe the following. If a server times out on s-1, it will never send a message and can only decide C-ROLLBACK (if it ever decides, cf. s-3.3.). The client necessarily executes c-3.1. and decides for C-ROLLBACK too. Other servers either time out on s-1 as well or receive the C-ROLLBACK decision in s-4. By assumption no server times out on s-4 (the blocked case). If the client times out on c-3.1., then it decides C-ROLLBACK and the servers can only reach the same decision by the very same argument. If the client times out on c-6.1., the only possible decision in the system is C-COMMIT and all servers must be in Phase 2. As we assume no blocking, all servers will eventually decide C-COMMIT. Thus AC2 is satisfied and, by the latter argument, AC5 as well. AC6 is vacuously true. ☐

In order to get any further we must some how deal with the problem of blocking. A blocked server timed out on s-5.3. and thus knows that it is blocked, but it is uncertain of the decision that may have been reached. In order to keep the Individual Commit Protocol correct, a Server's Commit Termination Protocol must be added. The purpose of the Server's Commit Termination protocol is to enable a blocked server to determine the (apparent) decision reached in the system. Several possible strategies for a successful Server's Commit Termination protocol have been proposed, all based on polling. (For example, if another server can be reached and it appears to have timed out on s-1, then the blocked server can decide C-ROLLBACK.) But no Server's Commit Termination protocol can guarantee that it will remove the possibility of blocking. (For example, if a blocked node is cut off permanently, it will forever remain uncertain.) We assume that any server can eventually reach the client again and thus a simple polling of the client will do as a
Server's Commit Termination protocol (cf. requirement AC6). We conclude the following result.

**Theorem C** If timeouts and loss of messages can occur, then the Individual Commit Protocol enhanced with the Server's Commit Termination protocol is correct.

The final step is to allow timeouts and arbitrary failures, i.e., “loss of protocol messages” and “site crashes”. If a site crashes permanently, the Individual Commit Protocol will simply continue in the remaining sites and perform as if the messages of the crashed site are lost from some point onwards. The Server’s Commit Termination protocol should be extended in this case and somehow detect permanent crashes of the client. In general there is no guaranteed solution that avoids blocking, if permanent crashes can occur. Thus we assume that each site that crashes eventually recovers and resumes the commit protocol. We also assume that a site can actually recover to the point where it crashed, using the information in its log. The only problem now is to determine how to continue with the commit protocol, knowing that the other sites may have advanced in it after the crash. We present a possible recovery protocol below.

**Commit Recovery Protocol**

**Client’s Commit Recovery**

**cr-1. If the client crashed before c-4 then**

\begin{Verbatim}
begin
Write “rollback” record to the Log;
Send C-ROLLBACK messages to all servers;
end;
\end{Verbatim}

**cr-2. If the client crashed after c-4 but before c-6.2. then**

\begin{Verbatim}
begin
Write “commit” record to the Log;
Send C-COMMIT messages to all servers; activate timer;
\{Await answer messages from all servers using timer and act as follows } 
Case condition of
\( \text{Timeout:} \) \hspace{1cm} \text{Write “incomplete” record to the Log;}
\( \text{All servers answered:} \) \hspace{1cm} \text{Write “complete” record to the Log}
end;
C-COMMIT
end;
\end{Verbatim}

**cr-3. If the client crashed after c-6.2. then**

\begin{Verbatim}
begin
perform c-7 if necessary
end;
\end{Verbatim}

**Server’s Commit Recovery**

**sr-1. If the server crashed before s-4 and without having executed s-3.1. then**

\begin{Verbatim}
begin
\end{Verbatim}
C-ROLLBACK
end;
sr-2. If the server crashed after s-4 while being uncertain
then
begin
use the Server's Commit Termination protocol to remove blocking
end;
sr-3. If the server crashed after s-4 while being certain
then
begin
perform remaining activity if necessary in the C-COMMIT or
C-ROLLBACK
(whatever applies)
end;

We assume that Write/Send commands in the Individual Commit Protocol are atomic, and thus no crash occurs "in between" a Write and the subsequent Send. (While the assumption is reasonable, it would nevertheless be of interest to analyse the protocol if this assumption is not made.)

Theorem D The Individual Commit Protocol enhanced with the Server's Commit Termination protocol and the Commit Recovery Protocol is a correct atomic commit protocol. Proof.
If the client crashes before c-4, then each server either has C-ROLLBACK as the only option or is uncertain. Thus cr-1 is a correct recovery action, in the sense of satisfying the requirements. If the client crashes in its Phase 2, then each server has either decided C-COMMIT or is uncertain. Replaying Phase 2 (in so far as it is needed according to the recovery log) is again the right action, assuming that the servers detect duplicate messages. If a server crashed in its Phase 1 and without sending a C-READY message, then the remaining sites will have progressed on the assumption that its messages are C-REFUSE or "lost". It means that the remaining sites are on their way to decide C-ROLLBACK, and sr-1 is fully consistent with this. If a server crashed after having sent a C-READY message, then either it had decided (and the decision is recovered) or is uncertain. Thus sr-2 and sr-3 are the actions to take. With the earlier analyses it easily follows that the complete protocol satisfies AC1 through AC6 and hence is correct. □
References


